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1CUSTODY OFFICERS, CODE C AND CONSTRUCTING VULNERABILITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
POLICY AND PRACTICE 
Abstract: This article addresses one of the issues with Code C to the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act (PACE) 1984—how vulnerability is defined for the purposes of implementing the 
appropriate adult safeguard. The article draws upon qualitative data (observation of and semi-
structured interviews with custody officers) to assess how custody officers define vulnerability. 
It illustrates why custody officers may experience difficulty in identifying vulnerability, drawing 
upon a problem that I have previously identified. Yet, it goes further than previous discussion by 
also offering suggestions for policymakers and practitioners.
Keywords: vulnerability, custody, PACE, appropriate adult 
Introduction 
This article explores the definitional issues with the (adult) vulnerability provisions under Code 
C to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984. PACE was introduced in England and 
Wales as a legislative framework in order to regulate police powers and the rights of suspects. 
Prior to its implementation, the Judgesǯ Rules and the accompanying Administrative Directions 
governed police practice for the treatment of suspects during police investigation. However, the 
Confait case drew attention to the failings of the Judgesǯ Rules – the defendants alleged that they 
had been coerced by police officers into providing a confession (Price and Caplan 1977) yet 
were convicted of various offences connected with the death of Maxwell Confait.i The Fisher 
Report, released in 1977 and investigating the Confait miscarriage of justice, in combination 
with the findings from the Criminal Law Revision Committee of 1971, led to the establishment 
of the Royal Commission for Criminal Procedure (RCCP). The RCCP produced its report in 1981, 
and it was this report that formed the basis of PACE and the Codes of Practice. The Act and 
Codes introduced the appropriate adult (AA) safeguard and the role of custody officer. The 
custody officer is a police officer of at least rank sergeant (s. 36 (3) PACE) who assumes 
responsibility for the suspectǯs rights and welfare whilst the suspect is kept in police custody. 
2The custody officer is also responsible for implementing the AA safeguard, which requires that 
he or she also identify that the suspect requires an AA (Code C 2014, para 3.5). However, neither 
PACE nor Code C provide custody officers with information on how vulnerability should, or can, 
be identified.   
Such guidance is provided within the College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice (APP) 
on Detention and Custody (College of Policing: Detainee Care 2015). The College is also in the 
process of developing additional guidance on mental health, due for release in 2016 (College of 
Policing:  Mental ill health 2015). As will be clear in this paper, however, some of the wording 
regarding vulnerability, particularly within Code C, is problematic. Moreover, the College of 
Policing guidance may not always be consulted (see later in this paper). Practical problems may 
also arise in the identification of vulnerability. For example, previous research has highlighted 
the difficulties that custody officers face when identifying vulnerability and have concluded that 
the safeguard was not implemented where it could have been (Bean and Nemitz 1995; Bradley 
2009; Brown, Ellis, and Larcombe 1992; Bucke & Brown 1997; Gudjonsson, Clare, Rutter and 
Pearse 1993; Irving and McKenzie 1989; Medford, Gudjonsson and Pearse 2003; National 
Appropriate Adult Network 2015; Palmer and Hart 1996; Phillips and Brown 1998).ii
Within this paper I explore how the definition of vulnerability may pose problems for custody 
officers, perhaps more so than that of identification. This paper therefore builds upon my 
arguments contained elsewhere, where I have contended that how vulnerability is defined, 
more so than identified, can explain why AAs are often not called for vulnerable adult suspects 
(see XXXX (forthcoming)).iii I previously explored three various explanations for the custody 
officer approach. Here I take one of these explanations (the legalistic-bureaucratic conception) 
and examine the potential reforms that may be made on the basis of this. The legalistic-
bureaucratic conception views police institutions as efficient bureaucracies (Dixon 1997, p.1) 
whereby decisions are directed by Ǯtraining, policy statements and internal regulationǯ ȋDixon, 
31997 p. 1). Thus, the focus of the legalistic-bureaucratic conception is Ǯonly or primarily… [on] 
the law governingǯ ȋDixon, ͳͻͻ͹, p. 1) the police. The focus of this paper is the question of how 
the legislature may improve the provision of AAs in police custody by providing improved 
guidance to custody officers. It also illustrates how an improvement in custody officer 
knowledge may facilitate the implementation of the AA safeguard. This paper will explore the 
definition of vulnerability in order to set the suggestions in context. It will therefore, in part, 
summarise some of the issues discussed elsewhere (see Dehaghani (forthcoming)). The purpose 
of this paper is not to suggest that we ignore the other explanations but aims to highlight the 
steps that policymakers and practitioners may take in Ǯsolvingǯ the AA problem. This paper 
therefore contributes to this somewhat neglected area by suggesting potentials for reform. 
Code C: Constructing vulnerability 
Code C requires that Ǯjuvenilesǯiv (those under the age of eighteen), the mentally disordered, and 
the mentally vulnerable be provided with an AA for the purposes of interview (Code C 2014, 
para 11.15). This paper addresses vulnerability for adult suspects, the definition for which is 
contained within Notes for Guidance 1G of Code C:  
ǮMentally vulnerableǳ applies to any detainee who, because of their mental state or 
capacity, may not understand the significance of what is said, of questions or of their replies. 
ǲMental disorderǳ is defined in the Mental (ealth Act ͷͿ;͹, section ͷȋ͸Ȍ as ǲany disorder or 
disability of mindǳ. When the custody officer has any doubt about the mental state or capacity of a 
detainee, that detainee should be treated as mentally vulnerable and an appropriate adult called.ǯ
Vulnerable suspects must be provided with an AA when interviewed with regard to their 
involvement or suspected involvement in a criminal offence or offences, or when they are asked 
to provide or sign a written statement under caution or record of interview (Code C para 11.15). 
In addition to their presence at interview, an AA should also be present at other stages of the 
process such as charging (Code C para 16.1), when cautions are given (Code C paras 7 & 10.12), 
when warnings in relation to adverse inferences are given (Code C para 10.11, para 10.11A), 
4where samples are to be taken (such as fingerprints, photographs and DNA), and where the 
suspect is subject to an intimate search (See Code C Annex A para 2B). 
 The AA is someone independent from the police inquiry, i.e. they must not be a police officer 
nor someone employed for, or engaged in, police work. They are required to facilitate 
communication, support, assist and advise the suspect, as well as ensure that the police are 
acting fairly (Code C 2014, para 11.17; see also Home Office Guide for Appropriate Adults 2011).  The AAǯs role is, of course, not without its problems. For example, (odgson has highlighted how 
AAs lack training, neglect to show empathy or may fail to understand their own role (Hodgson 
1997, p.786-7). Moreover, as Medford, Gudjonsson and Pearse have highlighted, the AA may add 
little to the police interview (2003, p.253). The AA may therefore be anything but appropriate 
(see Hodgson 1997, p786-7). Further, as Pierpoint has indicated, there are issues with the social 
construction of the role of the AA (2006). Nevertheless, as Medford, Gudjonsson and Pearse 
have indicated, the presence of the AA may have some benefit to the suspect – for example, their 
presence may ensure that a legal representative is present and that the legal representative 
takes a more active role (2003, p.253). 
Whilst Code C provides definitions of Ǯjuvenileǯ, Ǯmentally vulnerableǯ and Ǯmentally disorderedǯ, 
the definitions of the latter two not provided until much later, tucked away in a Note for 
Guidance (as given above). The importance of this will be explored later. 
On the basis of Code C vulnerability for adult suspect is ostensibly (1) a difficulty with or 
limitations in comprehension or understanding due to mental state or capacity (mental 
vulnerability); or (2) any disorder or disability of the mind (mental disorder)v. As will be 
illustrated later, vulnerability can encompass many illnesses and conditions, in addition to being 
a temporary issue affecting the suspectǯs mental state. (owever, Code C lacks consistency when 
utilising these terms and is, moreover, somewhat inaccessible. Whilst the College of Policing 
APP may prove helpful, the terms are not always consistent with Code C. For example, the APP uses terms such as Ǯmental ill healthǯ, Ǯlearning difficultiesǯ and Ǯmentally vulnerableǯ ȋCollege of 
5Policing: Mental ill health ʹͲͳ5Ȍ. )t does not however use the term Ǯmental disorderǯ in its 
headings (a term which may, of itself, be considered troublesome). This lack of consistency may 
prove problematic, as will be discussed further below. 
Methods 
Between early November 2014 and mid-January 2015 I observed the booking-in procedure at a 
large custody suite in England as a non-participant observer. This custody suite was chosen on 
the basis of size (thus yielding sufficient data) and access. Access was arranged through an 
acquaintance (the Assistant Chief Constable) and was facilitated by those in charge of the suite. 
Two of the officers approached declined the offer to take part, however, a total of 20 officers 
agreed. Of these 20, 15 were interviewed (from late January 2015 to early February 2015). 
Signage to advise suspects (and indeed anyone other than the custody officers) of my presence 
was placed at various points throughout the custody suite. The observations, whilst also used as 
data in their own merit, guided the interview schedule. The analysis and results in this paper 
derive solely from interview data. Interviews lasted an average of 41 minutes and were 
recorded and transcribed the same day. I asked custody officers the following questions: 
What does mental vulnerability mean to you? 
The term Ǯmentally disorderedǯ, what does that mean to you?
What do you think the purpose of the appropriate adult is?  
What is it you look for when deciding whether an appropriate adult is needed? vi
Observation and interview data were subject to coding and analysis in line with the grounded 
theory approach (Charmaz, 2006; see also Gibson and Hartman, 2014). It could also be 
suggested that the approach was Ǯgrounded theory liteǯ or thematic analysis ȋsee Dehaghani 
(forthcoming)). This paper does not explore the resulting theory, but instead deals with how 
vulnerability was defined, drawing upon interview data. 
Custody officers: Constructing vulnerabilityvii
6In this section I will explore custody officersǯ responses when asked to define vulnerability.viii
The questions asked at interview were used to ascertain how custody officers interpret Code C 
and how far they understand or make use of the definitions contained therein.  When asked at interview to define Ǯmentally vulnerableǯ not one of the ͳ5 custody officers interviewed gave the 
Code C definition nor was this definition mentioned or paraphrased. Instead, custody officers 
gave their own interpretation of what it meant for a suspect to be vulnerable. The most common 
response was that a vulnerable suspect was someone with learning difficulties/disabilitiesix or 
of significantly low intelligence. Upon reading the transcripts it was clear that custody officers had a vague idea of the terms Ǯmentally vulnerableǯ and Ǯmentally disorderedǯ. These quotes 
illustrate the typical approach: 
 Could include people suffering from mental illness or it could include people with learning 
difficulties.x
)tǯs difficult to put it into words. )f somebodyǯs got a mental illness… like schizophrenia or 
paranoia or something, then that comes under the umbrella of mental illness. But mentally 
vulnerable, ) suppose, if somebodyǯs really not understanding whatǯs happening, theyǯve got 
learning difficulties, maybe they struggle to read and write. Whether you class that as mental 
vulnerability or just vulnerability, ) donǯt know.xi
When asked at interview to define Ǯmentally disorderedǯ, custody officers appeared bewildered – this definition caused even greater difficulty than Ǯmentally vulnerableǯ.  Moreover, the term Ǯmentally vulnerableǯ was more readily used. Some custody officers were aware that mental 
health problems or learning difficulties could constitute a mental disorder yet appeared 
uncertain in their response.xii Responses also included references to medication and diagnosis 
as well as behavioural problems and cognitive impairments.xiii Whilst it was typically recognised 
that someone with a mental health problem or personality disorder could be Ǯmentally 
disorderedǯ, it did not necessarily follow that this person required an AA at interview or during 
any other time whilst in custody. Thus, not only was there confusion with regard to the meaning 
of the terms, even where a condition was recognised as a mental disorder it did not necessarily 
result in the implementation of the AA safeguard. This will be discussed in further detail below. 
7From the data there was overwhelming evidence to suggest that custody officers attempt to 
assess the suspectǯs mental capacity and his or her ability to communicate effectively in addition 
to his or her understanding of the criminal process.xiv It did not seem to matter that the detainee 
had a mental health problem or other mental disorder unless this was also accompanied by 
problems with capacity and understanding. This following quote illustrates this point: 
)ǯm sure that people that )ǯve dealt with have those issues, [those] who say Ǯ)ǯm bi-polarǯ or 
Ǯ)ǯm schizophrenicǯ. ) donǯt just automatically tick ǮNeed an appropriate adultǯ if thatǯs where youǯre 
running to.xv
Through analysis it transpired that the main focus for custody officers when deciding whether a 
suspect required an AA was his or her capacity, knowledge and understanding.xvi The suspectǯs 
understanding can be linked to a range of factors and can be ascertained in a number of ways. 
The custody officer will investigate whether the suspect has any issues that may produce an 
obstacle to his or her general understanding. Moreover, the custody officer may also seek to determine the suspectǯs mental capacity or abilities. This can initially be done through the 
answers given to the risk assessment (see College of Policing: Risk Assessment 2015) and 
manner in which in the suspect answers the questions. The custody officer may also attempt to 
establish whether the suspect understands his or her actions, the reason(s) for arrest and his or 
her rights (which are given upon booking-in). How the suspect understands the world around 
him or her, arguably in reference to what occurs within the custody suite, may also indicate to 
the custody officer that the suspect is vulnerable. 
This can be seen from the following excerpts, taken from interview transcript: 
 The risk assessment and other questions that you ask while youǯre booking people in allows 
you to gauge a level of intelligence or whether thereǯs other issues, as to whether [the AA 
safeguard] would be required or not.xvii
The central premise here is that if the suspect fails to understand the risk assessment, the world 
around him or her, and the reasons surrounding his or her arrest, he or she will also fail to 
understand the long-term implications of his or her arrest, the meaning of his or her rights and 
8entitlements and, most importantly for the purposes of custody, the questions asked at 
interview, and, more broadly, the interview process. This may then jeopardise the reliability of 
evidence (see s 76 PACE 1984). 
The main thing that )ǯm looking out for is to be able to protect them…what weǯre going 
through from a police point of view, in terms of whatǯs going on. And ) think you make sure that 
they fully understand what theyǯre saying, what theyǯre not saying and the impact that will have on 
the investigation and what happens from a criminal point of view, whether they are charged, 
cautioned, no further action, whatever it may be.xviii
When you go through their rights they say, ǮYes, )ǯd like a solicitorǯ or they appear to be 
fully engaging with you, ) would say they donǯt need an appropriate adult because they fully 
understand whatǯs happening… They know why theyǯre here, they understand the booking in 
process, and theyǯll be able to understand questions in interview.xix
Interestingly, and as the quote above indicates, custody officers are also looking for information 
on whether the suspect understands the criminal process. For example, regular offenders or 
those who have exposure to the criminal process may possess sufficient understanding of the 
criminal justice system in order to comprehend the police interview and wider criminal justice 
processes.xx When explaining why a suspect with schizophrenia wasnǯt provided with an AA, 
CO2 gave this explanation: 
 This person had had an awful lot of contact with the police and had been through the 
process of being arrested and dealt with quite a number of times and had quite a number of 
convictions. So I was quite comfortable with that decision. But if someone had very few dealings 
with the police then I would probably have an appropriate adult. But that would be purely because 
I would be concerned about their level of understanding of what was going on. 
This rationale may result in differential treatment between regular suspects and those new, or 
newer, to the criminal process.xxi As a result the former may not always avail of the same 
protection as the latter. The above discussion may, ostensibly, indicate that custody officers are focusing largely, if not solely, on the Ǯmental vulnerabilityǯ element of Code C, however, the 
problem does not end there. Through further analysis it transpired that custody officers were 
developing their own construction of vulnerability, upon which to implement the appropriate 
adult safeguard. This will be explored in greater detail below.xxii
9Before addressing the ǮCode C complicationǯ, it should be noted that custody officers often 
expressed negative sentiments regarding Code C. When asked at interview to explain the term Ǯmentally vulnerableǯ, COͻ stated that they Ǯdonǯt have guidance as to what mentally vulnerable 
meansǯ.xxiii Whilst this may, superficially, suggest that COͻ isnǯt aware of the guidance under 
Code C, it may also be suggested that he is aware of the term but feels that guidance is insufficient in that it doesnǯt explicate the term Ǯmentally vulnerableǯ. Moreover, other officers 
stated that they lacked knowledge of the vulnerability provisions under Code C. Whether 
custody officers are not aware that the guidance exists, are reluctant to read and digest it or, 
upon reading and digesting it, still donǯt understand what it means, is largely unimportant. What 
is overwhelmingly important is that custody officers, for whatever reason, do not feel they have 
sufficient knowledge or understanding to operationalise the Code C.xxiv
The foregoing section has set out that custody officers may be unable to operationalise the terms Ǯmental vulnerabilityǯ and Ǯmental disorderǯ, they exhibit difficulty when asked to 
articulate these terms, and they are developing their own benchmark upon which to assess 
whether the suspect is vulnerable. In the following section I will explain how Code C fails to 
adequately protect suspects by utilising elusive and ill-defined terms through which to explain 
vulnerability. 
The Code C complication 
As I have argued elsewhere (XXXX (forthcoming)), there is a large degree of ambiguity in 
relation to definitions contained within Code C. Thus, whilst Code C contains the definition of the term Ǯjuvenileǯ at the beginning of the Code ȋpara ͳ.5Ȍ, the definitions of mental vulnerability 
and mental disorder are mentioned much later, and in the Notes for Guidance. This result of this 
is two-fold. The first problem is practical – by not providing the definition from the outset, 
custody officers are required to leaf through the Code in order to find the definition. This is, of 
course, time-consuming and inconveniencing. As has been established in earlier research 
(Coppen 2008) custody officers are often under immense pressure – booking-in is time 
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consuming and can take up to 50 minutes (p. 85) and CPS Charging Guidance and the Mental (ealth Act ͳͻͺ͵ have impacted negatively upon the custody officerǯs role ȋpp. ͺ5-88). The 
second issue is symbolic – as discussed in another paper (Dehaghani (forthcoming)), the Notes 
for Guidance assume an even lower status than the Codes Ǯin terms of their authorityǯ ȋZander 
2013, p. 369). This may have the effect of suggesting that the protections for young suspects are 
more authoritative than that for adults.xxv Whilst, as Zander notes, there is very little practical 
difference between the Notes for Guidance and the Code (2013, p.369), this may not translate 
into custody officer practice. As I have previously argued, this issue may be further compounded 
by the fact that the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s 38 (4) (a) established a statutory duty for the 
Youth Offending Teams to provide young suspects with an AA. A similar duty does not exist in 
relation to adults. This again may suggest that vulnerable adult suspects may be of lesser 
importance than young suspects (see Dehaghani  (forthcoming)). It also provides a resource for 
young suspects, the equivalent of which is not available for adults. Given the pressures within 
custody, this may also impact upon custody officer practices. 
As I have also previously argued (Dehaghani (forthcoming)), there seems to be a degree of 
confusion with regard to the definitions – in the Notes for Guidance mental vulnerability and 
mental disorder are defined. The definition is sufficiently broad so as to encompass a whole 
range of conditions. There is however inconsistency with regard to the terms used – Note for 
Guidance 1G makes it clear that the custody officer should treat the detainee as mentally vulnerable should there be any doubt as to the detaineeǯs mental state or capacity, however, 
para 1.4 refers to suspicion or doubt utilised for both mental disorder and mental vulnerability. Whilst this is further reiterated in Annex E, the term Ǯmentally incapableǯ is also introduced, 
further complicating the matter. The use of the term Ǯany doubtǯ may also be impractical as a 
custody officer may be unable to say with absolute conviction that he has no doubt as to the detaineeǯs state or capacity. As also noted above, the College of Policing Guidance uses the 
headings Ǯmental ill healthǯ, Ǯmentally vulnerableǯ and Ǯlearning disabilities or difficultiesǯ, with the term Ǯmental disorderǯ appearing under the umbrella term Ǯmental ill healthǯ ȋCollege of 
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Policing: Mental ill health 2015). Whilst this may not be wholly factually incorrect, it may result 
in further disarray. As such, these multi-various terms may be confusing to custody officers and 
may, moreover, have the effect of deterring the officers from using the guidance, or may reduce 
the practical use of all guidance. Moreover, in the custody suite studied, custody officers were still using ǮSafer Detentionǯ ȋACPO ʹͲͳʹȌ – they did not seem to be aware of the College of 
Policing APP nor any other supplementary provisions (see College of Policing: Mental ill health 
2015). Safer Detention (ACPO 2012) also seems somewhat confusing – it discusses mental 
disorder, mental illness, mental health needs and mental vulnerability under the heading of Ǯmental ill health definitionsǯ ȋACPO ʹͲͳʹ, p. ͳ͵ͺȌ. 
Reflecting upon the Notes for Guidance 1G, in combination with the empirical data, it appears that custody officers may be neglecting Ǯmental disorderǯ as a category, focusing instead on the suspectǯs level of understanding i.e. Ǯmental vulnerabilityǯ. )t could thus be argued that by not 
providing this definition from the outset, Code C is insufficiently clear about what is expected of 
custody officers. Moreover, this term is not used in headings within the College of Policing 
guidance, as noted above. Upon perusal of the Note for Guidance 1G it is also apparent that the 
definitions are not provided in clear, unequivocal terms. This lack of clarity is demonstrated by the custody officersǯ responses at interview:
Thereǯs no hard and fast rule and weǯre not given any hard and fast guidance. )t just says, Ǯif 
a person needs an appropriate adultǯ.  )t doesnǯt say, Ǯapart from if they are a juvenile, they have to 
have an appropriate adultǯ because there are different degrees of mental illness.xxvi
This is further compounded by how Code C approaches vulnerability – it explains that 
vulnerable suspects may be those who may provide unreliable, misleading or self-incriminating 
information (Notes for Guidance 11C). It is therefore little wonder that for custody officers this 
pragmatically translates to issues with comprehension.  
As argued elsewhere (Dehaghani (forthcoming)), where the rules are clear, the safeguard may 
be implemented regardless of any additional factors, yet where the rules are ambiguous the 
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custody officer may consider other factors when making a decision. The impact of insufficient 
guidance is exemplified in the following excerpt taken from the interview with CO9: 
Anyone that is on the autistic spectrum, our rulebook says, ǮThey will have an appropriate 
adultǯ so… no matter how serious or mild you would get an appropriate adult.  
)f somebody booked into custody said that they suffered from schizophrenia, ) wouldnǯt 
automatically say, ǮRight appropriate adult for you thenǯ, because it might be that they suffer from 
schizophrenia but they take medication for it, theyǯre compliant with that medication and theyǯre 
fit to be dealt with.xxvii
This clearly illustrates that an AA may be obtained, at the very least by CO9, where guidance is 
clear about the categories of adult suspect vulnerability. That said, not every custody officer was 
aware of this guidance. There were, moreover, many discrepancies in knowledge between each 
of the custody officers. This is alarming given the fact that they work together and should be 
privy to the same information and guidance. This is also something that should be addressed by 
those responsible for providing guidance to custody officers. 
Further, whilst the vulnerability definitions under Code C are sufficiently broad, they can be 
misconstrued as Code C fails to provide well-defined, specific definitions of what Ǯmental disorderǯ and Ǯmental vulnerabilityǯ mean in relation to recognised conditions or situational 
issues. Whilst terms such as mental illness, low IQ, learning difficulty, learning disability, and 
difficulties reading and writing may be used to denote adult suspect vulnerability, these terms 
are absent from Code C. Moreover, not all of these terms are used in the College of Policing 
guidance (College of Policing: Mental ill health 2015), and as noted above, custody officers may 
not be aware of the updated guidance. It is therefore largely left to the custody officer to decide what the terms Ǯmental vulnerabilityǯ and Ǯmental disorderǯ actually mean and then to equate 
these with the information available to them. As noted, the Notes for Guidance 1G refer to mental disorder and state that this term should be understood as Ǯany disorder or disability of the mindǯ, as is defined under the M(A ͳͻͺ͵ sͳ ȋʹȌ. However, Code C fails to elaborate any 
further. The definition is no real definition at all – it would require that custody officers consult 
13
the MHA 1983 Code of Practice in order to establish what the definition means in real terms.xxviii
On this point custody officers are neither advised nor obliged to consult the MHA 1983 Code of 
Practice. Moreover, the practicalities of custodyxxix may be such that custody officers are under 
immense pressure and, as a result, may be too busy to consult additional guidance (see also 
Coppen 2008). In addition, I neither saw a copy of the MHA Code nor heard the Code mentioned 
on any occasion in custody. 
Clarifying Code C: changing the law to change practice? 
Building upon one of the arguments set out elsewhere (Dehaghani (forthcoming)) this paper 
has addressed how problems with the law and guidance may be impacting upon how custody 
officers construct vulnerability and, relatedly, whether they obtain an AA. The preceding section 
has explored how, on the basis of the legalistic-bureaucratic conception of law in policing (see Dixon ͳͻͻ͹Ȍ that the law is to blame for any Ǯgapǯ between the rhetoric of the law and the reality 
of police decision-making. Within the following section I will discuss the potential reforms 
which could be considered by police practitioners and policy makers.  
One potential adjustment would be to contain explicit guidance, within Code C, on how the terms Ǯmental vulnerabilityǯ and Ǯmental disorderǯ link-up with recognised conditions. As 
aforementioned, mental disorder is defined as Ǯany disorder or disability of the mindǯ – this 
includes a wide array of conditions, including but not limited to:xxx
• Affective disorders, such as depression and bipolar disorder
• Schizophrenia and delusional disorders
• Neurotic, stress-related and somatoform disorders, such as anxiety, phobic disorders, 
obsessive-compulsive disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder and hypochondriacal disorders 
• Organic mental disorders such as dementia and delirium ȋhowever causedȌ
• Personality and behavioural changes caused by brain injury or damage (however acquired) 
• Personality disorders
• Mental and behavioural disorders caused by psychoactive substance use 
• Eating disorders, non-organic sleep disorders and non-organic sexual disorders 
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• Learning disabilities  
• Autistic spectrum disorders ȋincluding Aspergerǯs syndromeȌ 
• Behavioural and emotional disorders of children and young people
Mental Health Act 1983: Code of Practice, p.26 
The term Ǯmental vulnerabilityǯ is perhaps more difficult to explain in relation to recognised 
conditions. It could be situational (for example as a result of simply being brought into 
custody)xxxi or could be something innatexxxii (such as a cognitive impairment or learning 
difficulty, which is not classed as a mental disorder). Following on from that, it could be a 
learning difficulty, i.e. a substantial impairment or obstacle, or learning disability, i.e. something 
that incapacitates, (Mindroom), a cognitive impairment, a special educational need or a 
temporary issue with understanding and communication.xxxiii
A lack of awareness as to the meanings of these terms is not necessarily something unique to 
custody officers. Indeed, in his review of mental health and learning disabilities in the criminal 
justice system, Lord Bradley found that, Ǯeven when talking to professionals in this field… there 
was a lack of consensus in defining the boundaries between learning disability, borderline learning disability and learning difficultyǯ ȋBradley, 2009, p. 19). By analogy, if professionals find 
these terms difficult, how can custody officers be expected to understand them? In this sense it is indeed true that, reiterating what COͻ stated at interview, custody officers really donǯt have 
any guidance with regard to what these terms mean. The College of Policing guidance ostensibly 
makes an attempt to explain these terms in greater detail but fails to link-up with Code C. Moreover, in the custody suite studied, custody officers were still using ǮSafer Detentionǯ ȋACPO 
2012) – they did not seem to be aware of the College of Policing APP nor any other 
supplementary provisions (see College of Policing: Mental ill health 2015).xxxiv
As also stated above, it may be unrealistic to expect custody officers to consult numerous texts, 
given the practical demands of custody.xxxv This may be further compounded by a lack of 
training – as Coppen noted, training for custody officers is a Ǯpostcode lotteryǯ ȋʹͲͲͺ, p. ͺʹȌ with 
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some officers receiving no training (pp. 82-83). For example, in the force studied mental health 
training was provided but focused more on risk (i.e. self-harm and suicide) than vulnerability 
for the AA safeguard.  
A Ǯgapǯ between the law in books and the law in action exists, at least in part, because of 
misunderstanding or inadequate understanding; in addition to consulting one piece of guidance 
to the exclusion of the other. Thus, on the basis of the preceding discussion, one potential step 
forward would be to improve the clarity of guidance and ensure consistency across the different 
pieces of guidance. 
Conclusion – bringing clarity and consistency? 
Unlike some other areas of PACE, the vulnerability provisions have not necessarily brought Ǯmuch needed clarity where there had previously been no clear rulesǯ ȋMaguire ʹͲͲʹ, p.ͻʹ in 
McConville and Wilson). Whilst it is clear from the discussion on custody officerǯs responses that 
they have a fair understanding of what vulnerable could mean, they are nevertheless applying 
their own (arguably practical and workable) construction to this definition (i.e. whether the 
suspect has previous knowledge of the criminal process or whether the suspect understands the 
basic risk assessment questions). This article has illustrated, as outlined elsewhere (Dehaghani 
(forthcoming)), that the Ǯvulnerabilityǯ definitions may explain why the AA safeguard is often 
left unimplemented. Within this article I have drawn attention to the lack of clarity and 
consistency both within C and between Code C and other pieces of guidance. This lack of clarity makes it difficult for custody officers to appreciate what Ǯvulnerabilityǯ means and thereby 
implement the AA safeguard. So what can be done?  
As mentioned above, the MHA 1983 Code of Practice may hold some of the answers, particularly 
in reference to mental disorder. Firstly, it contains a comprehensive (although not exhaustive) 
list of what constitutes a mental disorder. This list is neither long nor complicated, yet it 
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provides custody officers with more information by which to understand and thereby identify 
vulnerability.xxxvi This may enable custody officers to understand what is meant by mental 
disorder in relation to recognised medical conditions. In addition, the MHA also provides a 
definition of learning disability (MHA 1983 Code of Practice, p.206).  Additional definitions such 
as learning difficulty, special educational need or cognitive impairment may also be provided. 
Mental vulnerability (or at least some elements thereof) may nevertheless remain an elusive 
category, particularly where situational or contextual. Perhaps then too should Code C explicate 
that vulnerability can be situational (such as simply being brought into custody), in addition to 
being something innate (see Brown 2015).  Moreover, it is imperative that custody officers are 
made aware of these texts and encouraged to consult them. Further still, greater consistency 
should be ensured between the definitions contained within the MHA, and within PACE and 
Code C, to the effect that clinical definitions correspond with legal definitions. 
This paper has sought to draw attention to the problems with the law and guidance, as also 
argued elsewhere (Dehaghani (forthcoming)), yet this paper has gone further by suggesting 
ways in which policymakers and practitioners may help rectify the problems herewith outlined. 
It is perhaps naïve to think that a change in the guidance may encourage rule-adherence (see 
Ericson 2007, p.371-2). Indeed, as Ericson suggests, police officers may present their actions in Ǯrule-following termsǯ but Ǯwhen actually engaged in police workǯ, they may be Ǯvariously 
ignorant of potentially applicable rules, sidestep troublesome rules they think may be 
applicable, break rules if such action is deemed necessary to get the job done and use rules creatively to accomplish desired outcomesǯ (2007, p. 394). Custody officer construction of 
vulnerability may be an inescapable reality reflecting the practicalities of police work. But 
improving clarity and consistency may at least encourage custody officers to consult, and 
consider, the guidance. Custody officers may, of course, wish to continue using their own 
construction. Moreover, there is also a danger of rendering Code C an overwhelmingly long and tedious document ȋif it isnǯt so alreadyȌ. After 30 years of unclear guidance, perhaps it is time to 
call for a reformulation of the Code C provisions, coupled with additional training, to bring 
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clarity and consistency to an otherwise largely incomprehensible area.xxxvii As I have argued 
elsewhere (Dehaghani (forthcoming)) the issue is multi-faceted – a change in guidance and 
improved training could be a step in the right direction. 
i These convictions were later quashed. 
ii A large surge of this research occurred shortly after PACE was implemented and shortly after 
the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure in 1992, however there has been little research 
since then, particularly within the socio-legal sphere (perhaps with the exception of Pierpoint 
2006, 2008). Some work has been conducted within the forensic or social care context (see 
NAAN 2015; see also Bradley 2009).  
iii This paper also uses the same data set as the previous paper. 
iv ) prefer the term Ǯyoung suspectsǯ – although this term is not, of itself, unproblematic. 
v This definition will be elaborated upon later in this paper. 
vi There was some variation in the wording of the questions (in line with the semi-structured 
nature) but they largely followed the wording stated. 
vii It should be noted from the outset that I neither agree nor disagree with the views of the 
custody officers expressed at interview. 
viii I have explored some of the themes or characteristics discussed within the following section 
elsewhere (Dehaghani (in forthcoming)) yet my intention within this section, and indeed within 
this paper, is to ensure that discussion is relevant for practitioners and policymakers. I have 
therefore attempted to discuss the most relevant elements of how vulnerability is defined. 
ix These words were often used interchangeably. 
x CO20 Interview. 
xi CO9 Interview. 
xii The typical response referred to mental health or learning difficulties. 
xiii These references appear in the College of Policing guidance (College of Policing: Mental ill 
health 2015). 
xiv The ability to communicate is essential, as the interview may be fruitless without effective 
communication between the police and the suspect. 
xv CO3 Interview. 
xvi This may well be the intention of Code C, however, research has shown that even those who 
appear to have sufficient knowledge and understanding my experience difficulty when reading 
alone (Rock 2007). Moreover, those with capacity may nevertheless be 'unduly influenced by 
short-term gains ȋe.g. being allowed to go homeȌ and by the interviewerǯs suggestionsǯ 
(Gudjonsson, 1993 p.121 as cited in Gudjonsson, Hayes and Rowlands 2001, p.75).
xvii CO2 Interview. 
xviii CO14 Interview. 
xix CO9 Interview. 
xx There is some variation with regard to the Ǯusual suspectsǯ. For example, there are occasions 
where the use of an appropriate adult on a previous occasion will result in the use of the 
appropriate adult in the present. Thus, someone who is alleged to (or may) have previously 
offended may be given an appropriate adult. The decisions made herein are not straightforward 
and unfortunately there is no room for discussion within this paper. 
xxi See also Kemp and Hodgson (2015) in relation to young suspects. 
xxii The identification of vulnerability is explored in greater detail (Dehaghani (forthcoming)). 
xxiii CO18 Interview. This was also implicit in many interview transcripts. 
xxiv Upon further discussion custody officers seemed to feel that more in-depth knowledge 
would not necessarily be useful as they were relying on their own judgement anyway. I 
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nevertheless think that clarification would ultimately aid custody officers when identifying 
vulnerability in adult suspects. 
xxv See PSI Report (1983) on the function of legal rules. 
xxvi CO4 Interview. 
xxvii These two examples have also been provided in other works (see Dehaghani (forthcoming)).  
xxviii It should be noted, however, that custody officers were often aware that depression, for 
example, was a mental disorder. Yet, if depression did not result in issues with comprehension 
then it was an insufficient basis upon which to implement to AA safeguard. Perhaps if the 
guidance was more explicit then custody officers would recognise why a suspect with 
depression should be provided with an AA.  
xxix These practicalities include, but are not limited to, booking-in procedures (which may also 
require the use of Language Line), arranging informal and formal mental health assessments, 
and responsibilities towards those who have been brought into custody as a place of safety 
under the Mental Health Act 1983. 
xxx The Code of Practice for the MHA notes that this is not an exhaustive list. 
xxxi The guidance does make it clear that someone who is mentally vulnerable may not be 
suffering from a mental illness – see ACPO 2012, p. 138; and College of Policing APP: Mental Ill 
Health 2015. 
xxxii These terms have been borrowed from Brown 2015. 
xxxiii Again, this may raise issues with identification. 
xxxiv Note - first published: 23 October 2013; last modified: 28 July 2015.
xxxv It could, moreover, be unrealistic to expect custody officers to identify vulnerability, given 
their lack of expertise. This was a sentiment shared by all custody officers at the custody suite 
studied. 
xxxvi Although one could argue that, on the basis of the list, that most, if not all, suspects would be considered Ǯvulnerableǯ. This may make Code C impractical.
xxxvii Perhaps, more radically, the vulnerability definitions could be broadened to include every 
suspect in police custody (see Dehaghani (in progress)).
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